Three experiments investigated the role of visual attention in priming for object images and their left-right reflections. Objects to which participants attended were visually primed in both the same view and in the left-right reflected view; ignored objects were primed only in the same view. The effects of attention (attended vs. ignored) and view (same vs. reflected) were strictly additive. These results suggest that 2 separate representations mediate human object recognition (J. E. Hummel & B. J. Stankiewicz, 1996) : One requires attention but is invariant with left-right reflection, whereas the other can be activated automatically but is sensitive to left-right reflection. Both representations appear to be invariant with translation across the visual field.
properties of the visual representations generated in response to attended and ignored object images.
Object Constancy and Visual Attention
Humans' capacity to derive unchanging interpretations from highly variable images is typically referred to as object constancy. Human object constancy takes two forms. The best known is robustness to variations in viewpoint: Any given object can be viewed in an infinity of perspectives, each projecting a different image to the retina, but the ability to recognize an object is largely unaffected by these variations. Using a priming paradigm, Biederman and his colleagues (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993 , 1995 ; but see Tarr & Biilthoff, 1995) have shown that this capacity to ignore image variations due to viewpoint at least partially reflects the perceptual representation of object shape. The second form of object constancy is the ability to classify novel instances of familiar object classes: Entering a furniture store, one immediately recognizes the chairs as chairs and the tables as tables, even if one has never seen exactly those chairs or tables before. This capacity underscores the importance of representation in human object constancy: The visual system represents object shape in a form that is robust, not only to variations in viewpoint but also to variations in an object's actual three-dimensional (3-D) shape.
Theories of object recognition fall into two primary classes: normalization-based theories and structural description theories. Both classes of theories predict that attention will play an important role in object recognition. According to normalization-based theories, objects are represented in a viewpoint-specific format (such as two-dimensional views). Objects are recognized in novel viewpoints by means of normalization procedures--such as alignment, rotation, or view interpolation~at bring viewed images into correspondence with stored views (e.g., Edelman & Weinshall, 1991; Olshausen, Anderson, & Van Essen, 1993; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Seibert & Waxman, 1992; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 Ullman & Basri, 1991; Vetter & Poggio, 1994 ; see Tarr, 1995, for a review) . In these models, attention would control the processes that perform the normalization. For example, according to the normalization-based model of Olshansen et al. (1993) , attention serves to map viewpointspecific images into a view-like coordinate space that is invadant with size and translation. Once mapped into this space, the represented view is invariant with respect to the location and size of the original retinal image. 1
Structural description theories differ from normalizationbased theories in that they emphasize the role of representation (rather than normalization processes) in object constancy. These theories assume that objects are represented in a format that is invariant with some (but not necessarily all) variations in viewpoint (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Dickinson, Pentland, & Rosenfeld, 1992; Hummel & Biederman, 1990 Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996; Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Sutherland, 1979; Winston, 1975; see Quinlan, 1991, for a review) . In these models, recognition is invariant with viewpoint to the extent that the representation on which it is based is invariant with viewpoint. Attention enables the generation of a viewpoint-invariant structural description from an object's image. For example, the models of Hummel and Biedermaa (1992) and Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) represent objects as structural descriptions specifying the interrelations among their volumetric parts (geons). Importantly, the parts and relations are represented independently, making it necessary to actively--or "dynamically"wbind parts to their relations (see . There is strong evidence that binding independent visual attributes requires visual attention (Enns, 1992; Logan, 1994 ; see also Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe et al., 1989) , suggesting that attention may be necessary for generating structural descriptions . Accordingly, these models predict that the visual system will generate a structural description in response to an attended image, but not in response to an ignored image; as a consequence, the representation of an attended image will be more robust to variations in viewpoint than the representation of an ignored image. Thus, regardless of one's perspective on how the human visual system achieves object constancy (e.g., by normalization or s~ description), there are reasons to hypothesize that object constancy will require visual attention.
Importantly, this is not to say that attention is necessary for object recognition (see Tipper, 1985; Tipper & Driver, 1988; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996) . Rather, the hypothesis is that the representations mediating recognition will differ as a function of whether an object is attended or ignored: The visual representations activated in response to an attended object will be more robust to variations in viewpoint than that activated in response to an ignored object. We tested this hypothesis by exploring the role of attention in priming for left-right reflections of object images.
Visual Priming and Invariance With Left-Right Reflection
Using a priming paradigm, B iederman and Cooper (1991 a) showed that some component of the visual representation mediating object recognition is invadant with left-right reflection. Participants viewed and named line drawings of common objects in two blocks of trials (prime block and probe block). Images displayed during the probe block belonged to one of three different conditions: An image was either identical to an image the participant had named during the prime block (identical), a left-fight reflection of an image named in the prime block (reflected), or an image of an object the participant had not named during the first block (unprimed).2 The dependent measure of primary interest was priming for images and left-right reflections of images participants had named during the prime block (operationalized as the difference between response times to name identical or reflected images and response times to name unpfimed images). Biederman and Cooper found that object images visually primed their left-right reflections just as much as they visually primed themselves: That is, visual priming was completely invariant with left-fight reflection. This result suggests that the visual representation mediating object recognition is invariant with left-fight reflection (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a) . (Or, as elaborated shortly, a component of this representation is invariant with reflection.) The models of Hummel and his colleagues accounted for this invariance in terms of the parts and relations that comprise the structural description of an object image (see . On the assumption that these representations are activated only in response to attended images (because of the need for dynamic part-relation binding), these models predict that attended images will prime their left-right reflections, but ignored images will not (Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996) . 3
The basic experimental paradigm was as follows. Trials were grouped into prime-probe pairs (see Figure 1) . On a prime trial, two line drawings of common objects were displayed on a computer screen. One object was precued. The participant's task was to name the cued image (the attended prime); they were not required to respond to the other (the ignored prime). Each prime display was followed by a probe display, during which a single image (a probe) appeared on the screen. Again, the participant's task was to name the image. The probe image depicted either the same object as the attended prime, the same object as the ignored prime, or an object the participant had not previously seen in the experiment (an unprimed probe). In Experiments 1 and 3, probe images (except for unprimed probes) were either identical to the corresponding primes, or were left-right lit is important to realize that the predictions made by the Olshausen et al. (1993) model do not necessarily speak to all models that use normalization procedures.
2 There were other conditions as well, but these three are of primary interest in the context of our current discussion.
3 With respect to the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) model, the prediction about left-right reflection is particularly clear:. An attended image should prime itself and its left-right reflection, whereas an ignored image should prime only itself and not its left-right reflection. reflections of them. Priming is operationalized as the difference between naming response times to primed and unprimed probe images. In Experiments 1 and 3, attended prime images reliably primed both themselves and their left-right reflections. However, ignored prime images only primed themselves. Experiment 3 also replicated Biederman and Cooper's (1991a) finding by measuring long-term (rather than short-term) priming. Experiment 2 served as a control for name and concept priming, and showed that a component of the priming observed in Experiments 1 and 3 was specifically visual. In this experiment, identical probes were replaced with same name, different exemplar (SNDE)
probes--probes that had the same names as the corresponding primes, but were different exemplars with different 3-D shapes (e.g., if the prime was a jet [name: airplane], the SNDE probe would be a Cessna [name: airplane]).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 served as a basic test of whether attention plays a role in visual priming for left-fight reflections of object images. Participants fixated on the center of a computer screen while two line drawings of common objects were displayed simultaneously on the left and right sides of the screen. Participants were instructed to name, as quickly and accurately as possible, the object that appeared within the cuing square. The cuing square appeared on the screen just before the images and remained on the screen until the images were replaced with a pattern mask. Approximately 3 s after the prime display, the participant viewed a probe display consisting of a single image in the center of the screen. Again, the task was to name the object as quickly and as accurately as possible. The probe was either the same as the prime they had just named (an attended probe), the same as the prime they had just ignored (an ignored probe), or an image of an object the participant had not previously seen in the experiment. Probes were presented either in the same view as the corresponding primes (identical probes), or were left-right reflections of those primes (reflected probes). The dependent measure of interest was the effect of attention on priming for identical and left-right reflected probes.
Me~od
Participants. Twenty-eight native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated for credit in introductory psychology courses at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Materials. Procedure. Each object was placed into one of seven conditions (attended-identical, attended-reflected, attended-not probed, 4 ignored-identical, ignored-reflected, ignored-not probed, and unprimed). All objects appeared in all seven conditions equally often. The ordering of the trials was randomized for each participant, as was the pairing of attended and ignored objects on prime trials. Prime orientation (left facing vs. fight facing) was counterbalanced across participants. The experimenter read instructions to the participant, after which the participant paraphrased the instructions back to the experimenter. The participant then received 24 practice trials. After the practice phase, the computer displayed End of Practice, and the participant was asked if he or she had any questions.
Prime displays began with an unfilled circle (subtending 0.032 ° of visual angle) in the center of the screen. This circle remained on the screen until the participant initiated the trial with a keypress. After the keypress, the circle was replaced with a filled fixation dot, which remained on the screen for 495 ms. A white screen was then displayed for 30 ms, followed by an attentional cuing square (4.57* on a side) presented either to the left or right of the fixation dot. The center of the cuing box was 4.0* from the center of the screen. After 75 ms, two line drawings were displayed on the computer screen for 120 ms. One appeared inside the square (the attended image) and the other appeared on the other side of the screen (the ignored image). Both images were centered 4.0* from the center of the screen (fixation). Following a 30-ms blank screen, a random-line pattern mask was displayed on the screen for 495 ms. The mask covered the entire screen (subtending 15.6" of visual angle). To prevent participants from moving their eyes to the fixation square or either object, the entire prime display lasted less than 200 ms, a duration too brief to permit a saccade. The participant's task was to say the name of the cued (attended) object as quickly and as accurately as possible into the microphone. Response times were recorded by the computer through a voice key attached to a microphone.
Following the prime display, the screen was left blank for 1,995 ms. This was followed by a fixation dot (0.032*) displayed for 495 ms. Following a 30-ms blank screen, the probe image was displayed in the center of the screen for 150 ms. The probe was either the attended image, the left-right reflection of the attended image, the ignored image, the left-right reflection of the ignored image, or an unprimed image: A total of 3,015 ms elapsed between the end of the prime display and the beginning of the probe display (495 ms for the prime mask; 1,995 ms for the blank screen; 495 ms for the probe fixation dot; and 30 ms blank). Following the probe, a single pattern mask (4.57*) appeared in the center of the screen for 495 ms. Participants were instructed to name the probe as quickly and as accurately as possible. After the participant named the probe, the computer displayed the names of the attended prime and the probe along with the probe response time. Participants were allowed to view this feedback for as long as they wished, and indicated they were finished by means of a keypress. At the end of each trial, the experimenter used the keyboard to record the participant's accuracy on the prime and probe displays. The experimenter also recorded all trigger errors (i.e., when the voice key did not trigger, or triggered before the participant actually responded). incorrect and trials on which probe response times exceeded 3 s were omitted from these calculations (4.15%). In all conditions, priming was calculated as the difference between each participant's mean response time in the unprimed (baseline) condition and the participant's mean response times in each of the other probe conditions.
Results
A 2 (attended vs. ignored) × 2 (identical vs. reflected) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a reliable main effect of attention, F(1, 27) = 50.33, p < .001, and view, F(1, 27) = 7.93, p < .01, but the interaction between attention and view did not approach reliability, F(1, 27) = 0.23.
Matched pairs t tests were conducted on each priming condition to determine which conditions demonstrated priming (i.e., faster naming responses relative to unprimed probes). Priming was reliably greater than zero in the attended-reflected, t(27) = 7.35, p < .001; attendedidentical, t(27) = 9.69, p < .001; and ignored-identical conditions, t(27) = 2.14, p < .05, but not in the ignoredreflected condition, t(27) = 0.13, p > .05. Attended images were primed in both the same and reflected views, but ignored images were primed only in the same view. The difference between the attended-identical and attendedreflected conditions was statistically reliable, t(27) = 2.96,p < .01, as was the difference between the ignored-identical and ignored-reflected conditions, t(27) = 2.11, p < .05. Identical probes enjoyed a similar advantage in priming over reflected probes in the attended and ignored conditions (~5 0 ms).
Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed more than 180 ms of priming for left-right reflections of attended images, but no priming for left-right reflections of ignored images. However, both attended and ignored images were primed in the same view. Like negative priming for ignored images (Tipper, 1985; Tipper & Driver, 1988; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996) , this result suggests that object recognition may take place in the absence of attention. However, ignored objects were primed only in the identical view, suggesting that the representation mediating recognition without attention is sensitive to left-right reflection. Perhaps most interesting, the data revealed approximately 50 ms more priming for identical probes than for reflected probes in both the attended and ignored conditions. That is, the effects of attention (attended vs. ignored prime) and view (identical vs. reflected probe) were strictly additive. This pattern suggests that two separate representations mediate object recognition: One is invariant with left-right reflection but requires attention, and the other is sensitive to left-right reflection but does not require attention.
Another interesting aspect of these findings is that the ignored images were primed in the same view even though the prime and probe images appeared in different parts of the visual field. (Recall that prime images were presented either to the left or right of fixation, whereas probe images were presented at fixation, and that the prime displays were too brief to permit eye movements.) Even for ignored images, priming obtains despite translation across the visual field. This suggests that the same-view priming for ignored images does not simply reflect priming in an early representation of local (i.e., retinotopic) image features. It also suggests that the visual system may achieve invariance with translation even without attention. 6 (If attention were required to correct for translation, then we would have observed no priming for the ignored images in either the same or reflected views.) This result is inconsistent with Olshausen et al.'s (1993) hypothesis that attention serves to correct for the location of an image in the visual field. Other implications of this finding, including its relation to previous findings (e.g., Ellis, Allport, Humphreys, & Collis, 1989) , are elaborated in the General Discussion.
An important limitation of Experiment 1 is that attention was perfectly confounded with naming: Not only did participants attend to the cued images and ignore the uncued images, but they also named the cued images and did not name the uncued images. It is possible, therefore, that all the priming we observed for left-right reflections in the attended condition was simply name, or concept priming, or both. Perhaps the visual representations that mediate object recognition are completely viewpoint-specific, and only the name and concept are invariant with left-right reflection. Experiment 2 was designed to test this possibility. In particular, it was designed to provide an index of how much of the priming for attended objects is name or concept priming, and how much is specifically visual priming.
Experiment 1 showed that the attended primed representation is at least partially sensitive to left-right reflection. This finding is inconsistent with B iederman and Cooper's (1991 a) finding that visual priming is invariant with left-right reflection. An important difference between Experiment 1 and Biederman and Cooper's (1991a) studies is in the duration between the prime and probe displays. Experiment 1 used a short-term priming paradigm in which probe displays followed each prime display with an interdisplay time of about 3 s. Biederman and Cooper (1991a) used a long-term priming paradigm in which prime and probe displays were separated on the order of 5-10 min. Experiment 3 investigated the effect of prime--probe interdisplay time on viewpoint-sensitive versus viewpoint-invariant priming.
Experiment 2
To measure nonvisual priming (and, by subtraction, estimate visual priming), in this experiment we replaced the identical-image condition of Experiment 1 with an SNDE condition (following Biederman & Cooper, 1991a) . Here, probes were either unprimed images (unprimed probes, as in Experiment 1), left-fight reflections of prime images (refleeted probes, as in Experiment 1), or objects that shared the name and concept--but not the same 3-D shape---with a primed image (SNDE probes, instead of the identical probes in Experiment 1). For example, if a left-facing grand piano (name: piano) served as a prime image, then a right-facing grand piano would serve as the reflected probe, an upright piano (name: piano) would serve as the SNDE probe, and the image of some other object (e.g., a jet, name: airplane) would serve as the unprimed (baseline) probe. If some of the priming for reflections of attended objects observed in Experiment 1 was specifically visual, then this experiment should reveal more priming for reflected probes than for SNDE probes. But if all of the priming for left-right reflections observed in Experiment 1 was simply name or concept priming, then the reflected and SNDE probes in this experiment should show equal amounts of priming (see Biederman & Cooper, 1991a) .
Me~od
Participants. Forty native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated for credit in introductory psychology courses at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Materials. The experiment used two sets of objects: a set of SNDE pairs and a set of filler objects (objects with no SNDE counterpart). The conditions in Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1, except that the identical image condition was replaced by the SNDE condition and the unprobed conditions were replaced with filler objects. In the SNDE condition, each prime image was paired with an image of a different object with the same name (rather than being paired with itself, as in the identical image condition of Experiment 1). There were 35 pairs of SNDE objects and 42 filler objects. Each SNDE object appeared equally often in each of the five probe conditions (i.e., attended--~flected, attended--SNDE, ignored-reflected, ignored-SNDE, and unprimed). The filler objects were used as unprobed objects (e.g., if the attended prime was probed, then the ignored image was a filler).
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that the identical condition was replaced with the SNDE condition.
Results
Priming data are shown in Figure 3 . Trials in which the prime or probe responses were incorrect or response times exceeded 2 s were omitted from the analysis (11.28%).7 The remaining data were subjected to a 2 (attended vs. ignored) × 2 (SNDE vs. reflected) within-subjects ANOVA. There was a reliable main effect of attention, F(1, 39) = 78.04, p < .001, and a main effect of object type, F(1, 39) = 4.12, p < .05. The interaction between attention and object type was marginally reliable, F(1, 39) = 3.59, p = .065. Post hoe matched-pairs t tests revealed that there was reliably more priming for reflected probes than for SNDE probes in the attended condition, t(39) = 4.84, p < .01, but not in the ignored condition, t(39) = 0.20. On average, attended images primed their left-right reflections 65 ms more than they primed their SNDE counterparts. Ignored images primed neither their reflections nor their SNDE counterparts.
Each priming condition was subjected to a matched-pairs t test to determine whether it revealed nonzero priming (i.e., decreased naming response times relative to unprimed probes). Priming was reliably greater than zero in both the attended-SNDE, t(39) = 4.98, p < .001, and attendedreflected conditions, t(39) = 7.56, p < .001, but it was not reliably greater than zero in either the ignored--SNDE, t(39) = 0.43, or ignored-reflected conditions, t(39) = 0.81.
Discussion
The purpose of this research was to explore the role of attention in visual priming for left--fight reflections of object images. Experiment 1 showed that attended images prime their left-right reflections, and Experiment 2 showed that at least a component of this priming (approximately 85 ms) is specifically visual. This estimate of visual priming is arguably conservative, as it is premised on the assumption that an object and its SNDE counterpart share no visual attributes (specifically, they do not share the same object model; see Cooper, Biederman, & Hummel, 1992) . To the extent that an object and its SNDE counterpart share visual attributes, then priming for SNDE probes likely overestimates the magnitude of nonvisual priming; to the extent that SNDE priming overestimates nonvisual priming, the difference between SNDE and reflected priming underestimates visual priming. These results thus provide further evidence that attention plays an important role in building visual representations that are invariant with left-right reflection.
This experiment revealed no SNDE priming for ignored images, suggesting that priming for ignored images is specific, not only to viewpoint (left-vs. right-facing), but also to an object's particular 3-D shape. In turn, this result suggests that attention may play a role in object constancy broadly defined, rather than simply in generalization over viewpoint. In contrast to the findings of Tipper (1985) , this result revealed no evidence for higher level (e.g., conceptual or semantic) priming of ignored objects.
One limitation of Experiments 1 and 2 is that the confounding of attention and naming makes it difficult to determine whether it was attention per se or simply naming that caused the priming of the viewpoint-invariant shape representation: The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with both accounts. However, previous studies suggest that naming is not necessary to prime a left-right invariant representation of shape. For example, Srinivas (1996) used a "facing" judgment (i.e., "Is the object facing to the left or fight?") during the prime phase, and during the probe phase participants either named the objects or made the facing judgment. In both experiments, she found leftright reflection-invariant priming. Because Srinlvas's participants did not name the objects during the prime phase, these studies suggest that naming is not necessary for priming a left-right-invariant representation of object shape.
Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was twofold. First, it was designed to test whether the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 would replicate under a different attention manipulation: Is attending versus ignoring, per se, responsible for the observed differences in priming, or is it the case that the primes' differing positions in the visual field were also instrumental in the observed effects? This question is especially important given that the effects of attention selection depend, in part, on the ease of selection (Ruthruff & Miller, 1995) . Selecting objects on the basis of location in the visual field is arguably easier than selecting overlapping Figure 3 . Priming means and standard errors for Experiment 2 as a function of whether the object was attended or ignored and whether the object was identical to the prime image or an object having the same name but being a different exemplar (SNDE). LR = left-right.
7 The greater number of omitted trials in the current experiments relative to those reported by Biederman and Cooper (1991a) is due primarily to the nature of the prime display. Often, participants either could not name the attended prime, or they named the ignored image by mistake. These trials were omitted from analysis. objects on the basis of, say, color (e.g., Tipper, 1985) . Perhaps this difference explains our failure to replicate Tipper's finding of high-level priming for ignored images. The second purpose of Experiment 3 was to help us understand why our findings differ from those of Biederman and Cooper (1991a) . Biederman and Cooper (1991a) found complete invariance with left-right reflection in visual primingmthat is, images primed their reflections just as much as they primed themselves. By contrast, our results showed an advantage for same-view priming over reflectedview priming, even in the attended condition. One plausible explanation for this difference is that the time between our prime and probe displays was on the order of 3 s, whereas several minutes elapsed between prime and probe displays in Biederman and Cooper's (1991a) experiment. It is possible that the same-view priming effect we observed is short lived, and that, under longer prime-probe delays, we (like Biederman and Cooper, 1991a) will observe complete invariance in priming for left-right reflections. This seems especially plausible given that Ellis and AUport (1986; Ellis et al., 1989) found evidence for short-lived viewpointsensitive representations of object shape.
The prime displays in Experiment 3 consisted of two superimposed objects, one red and one green. Participants selected objects for naming, not based on location (attended and ignored images were in the same location), but based on color. (Half of the participants named red objects, and half named green ones.) To test the role of prime-probe delay, we also added a long-term probe condition to this experiment. Objects that were not immediately probed (i.e., on the following trial) were probed in a series of trials at the end of the experiment. If our failure to observe complete invariance with left-right reflection in Experiments 1 and 2 reflects the short prime-probe delays in those experiments, then we should observe complete invariance in priming with the delayed probes. This explanation of the distinction between our findings and those of Biederman and Cooper (1991a) thus predicts an interaction between attention, left-right reflection, and prime-probe delay.
Method
attended jet airplane and an ignored piano, and the immediate probe was a jet airplane, then the piano served as one of the long-term probe images. The display sequence for the lung-term probes was identical to the display sequence for the immediateprobe displays. The time between primes and long-term probes averaged about 7 rain. Figure 4 shows the pattern of priming observed in the immediate probe condition. Trials with incorrect prime or probe responses and trials with probe response times over 3 s were omitted from the analysis (12.32%).
Results
A 2 (attended vs. ignored) × 2 (identical vs. reflected) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a reliable main effect of attention, F(1, 35) = 88.92,p < .001, and view, F(1, 35) = 9.40, p < .01. As in Experiment 1, the interaction between attention and view did not approach statistical reliability, F(1, 35) = 0.10.
Each priming condition was subjected to a matehed-pairs t test to determine whether it revealed statistically reliable priming. As before, all conditions except the ignoredreflected condition revealed reliable priming: attendedreflected, t(35) = 7.83, p < .001; attended-identical, t(35) = 10.02, p < .001; ignored-identical, t(35) = 1.98, p = .056; ignored-reflected, t(35) = 0.58, p > .05. Priming was again reliably greater in the attended-identical condition than in the attended-reflected condition, t(35) = 2.38, p < .05, and reliably greater in the ignored-identical condition than in the ignored-reflected condition, t(35) = 2.11, p < .05. This pattern of results is identical to that observed in Experiment 1, even though attended and ignored primes were designated by color rather than location. Figure 5 summarizes the long-term priming results. Trials on which prime or probe responses were incorrect and trials on which probe response times exceeded 3 s were omitted from the analysis (7.32%).
A 2 (attended vs. ignored) × 2 (identical vs. reflected) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a reliable main effect of attention, F(1, 35) = 43.37, p < .001, but not of view, F(1, Participants. Thirty-six native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated for credit in introductory psychology courses at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Materials. The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. The prime displays consisted of a red object superimposed over a green object on a black background. Probe objects were drawn in white on a black background. Attended and ignored primes were paired as in Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that participants selected objects for naming according to color. Eighteen participants named red objects and 18 named green objects.
Another difference between Experiments 1 and 3 was the use of long-term and immediate probes in Experiment 3. The long-term probe displays occurred in a single block after the prime and immediate probe trials. The long-term probes consisted of the primed and unprimed images that were not probed in the immediate probe condition. For example, if the prime display consisted of an Each priming condition was subjected to a matched-pairs t test to determine whether it revealed statistically reliable priming. Priming was observed in the attended-reflected, t(35) = 4.84, p < .001, and attended-identical conditions, t(35) = 5.28, p < .001, only: ignored-identical, t(35) = 1.70, p > .05; ignored-reflected, t(35) = 1.04, p > .05. Matched pairs t tests revealed no reliable differences between priming for identical and reflected images, in either the attended, t(35) = 1.04, p > .05, or the ignored condition, t(35) = 0.39, p > .05. These data--in particular, the lack of difference between identical and reflected probes under delayed priming---replicate the complete invariance with left-right reflection observed by Biederman and Cooper (1991a) .
A 2 (attended vs. ignored) × 2 (identical vs. reflected) × 2 (probe delay: short vs. long) within-subjects ANOVA revcaled a main effect of attention, F(1, 35) = I11.22,p < .01; a main effect of view, F(I, 35) = 6.63, p < .05; and a main effect of probe delay, F(1, 35) = 13.68, p < .01. As predicted, the View × Delay interaction was also statistically reliable, F(I, 35) = 8.65, p < .05. Furthermore, the Attention × Delay interaction was also statistically reliable, F(I, 35) = 8.65, p < .01. However, the Attention × View interaction was not statistically reliable, F(I, 35) = 0.05. The three-way interaction also was not statistically reliable, F(1, 35) = 0.60.
Discussion
The immediate probe condition of Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 1 with objects selected by color rather than location. Like the results of Experiments 1 and 2, these results provide further support for the notion that object recognition is mediated by two separate representations, one that requires attention, but is invariant with left-right reflection, and one that is sensitive to left-fight reflections but does not require attention. The fact that Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 1 so cleanly suggests that the effect speaks to the role of attention per se, rather than the role of specific cues (such as location or color) whereby attentional selection may operate.
The long-term probe condition replicated Biederrnan and Cooper's (1991a) finding of complete invariance with left-fight reflection under long prime-probe delays (several minutes). This interaction (between attention, left-fight reflection, and prime-probe delay) suggests that the viewpoint-specific priming observed in both the attended and ignored conditions of Experiment I and the immediate probe condition of this experiment is only short-lived. By contrast, the component of the priming that isinvadant with left-fight reflection is longer lasting.
General Discussion
Attention plays an important role in visual perception. Among other things, it serves to select elements in a scene (LaBerge & Brown, 1986 Wolfe et al., 1989) , speed the processing of selected elements (Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993a; 1993b) , and bind visual attributes into groups (Enns, 1992; Logan, 1994; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . Theoretical work in object recognition suggests that attention should also play an important role in generating object representations for recognition, either by normalizing view-like representations (Olshausen et al., 1993) , or by enabling the generation of viewpoint-invariant structural descriptions (Hummel & Biederman, 1991 Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996) . Consistent with these predictions, the findings reported here suggest that attention affects the qualitative properties of the visual representation of object shape.
In three experiments, participants viewed pairs of object images, one of which they attended (and named), and the other they ignored. Both attended and ignored images were visually primed in the same view (Experiments 1 and 3). This effect was obtained despite the fact that prime images were viewed off fixation, whereas probe images were viewed at fixation. That is, priming, even for ignored images, is robust to translation across the visual field (see also Biederman & Cooper, 1991a ). This finding is important because it shows that the observed priming reflects representations and/or processes other than simple local image features. It also suggests that attention may not be needed to activate a representation that is invariant with translation across the visual field. Although attention appears to play little role in discounting location in the visual field, it does enable the visual system to represent object shape in a manner that is invariant with left-fight reflection. (Attended objects were primed in both the same view and the left-right reflected view, whereas ignored objects were palmed only in the same view.) Experiment 2 showed that a substantial component of the priming for left-fight reflections is specifically visual, rather than just name or concept priming.
The visual priming we observed has two separate components. One is short lived (lasting at least 3 s, but less than 5 min; Experiment 3), relatively viewpoint-sensitive (robust to translation [Experiments 1 and 2], but affected by reflection [Experiments 1-3]), and independent of attention (Experiments 1-3). The other is longer lasting (lasting at least 5 min; Experiment 3), invariant with both translation and reflection, and dependent on attention (it was obtained for attended but not ignored images; Experiments 1-3). The effects of viewpoint and attention were additive in the short prime-probe delay conditions of Experiments 1 and 3: Attended objects enjoyed the same amount of short lived same-view priming as ignored objects (about 50 ms).
Additive Effects of Attention and Viewpoint
Attention (attended vs. ignored) and viewpoint (same vs. reflected) had additive effects on priming in the short prime-probe delay conditions of Experiments 1 and 3. This additivity is important in the context of the theoretical interpretation of the current findings. Most generally, it suggests that the automatic, view-sensitive representation of object shape is relatively independent of the attentionconsuming, reflection-invariant representation (Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996) . However, there are at least two specific versions of this interpretation of the additivity.
The account that follows most naturally from the usual interpretation of additive effects is that the data reflect processes operating on independent parts of the system (Sternberg, 1969) . For example, in the context of the current findings, perhaps the representation that gets primed without attention (the automatic representation) resides in an early part of the processing stream, whereas the representation that gets primed only with attention (the controlled representation) resides at a later part of the stream. Object memory resides at the end of the stream. If one assumes that priming in the early, automatic representation is short-lived and view-sensitive (i.e., because the representation, itself, is view-sensitive), whereas priming in the later, controlled representation is longer-lived and reflection-invariant (i.e., because the representation is invariant with reflection), then this model can account for all of the findings reported here. When an image is attended, both representations will be primed. If that image is then immediately presented again (probed) in the same view, then the system will profit from the priming in both representations: It will be faster (by, say, 50 ms) to activate the automatic representation, and it will also be faster (by, say, an additional 100 ms) to activate the controlled representation. The total priming effect will be 150 ms. If the image were probed in the left-right reflected view, then the system would profit only from the priming in the controlled representation (because the wrong automatic representation has been primed), and the total priming effect will be 100 ms. Next, consider what will happen to an ignored image. Here, only the automatic representation will be primed (again by 50 ms). Probing immediately with the same image will result in 50 ms of total priming, but probing with a left-right reflection will result in no priming. The effects of attention and viewpoint would be additive: no priming for the reflected image without attention, 50 ms of priming for the same view without attention, 100 ms for attention without the same view, and 150 ms for the same view plus attention. Moreover, at long prime-probe delays, priming will be completely invariant with left-fight reflection because all of the (short-lived) automatic, viewpointsensitive priming will have disappeared over the delay.
Although this serial model accounts for the findings reported here, it is limited in that it cannot account for the findings that motivated the experiments. Specifically, on the serial model, the automatic representation does not make any direct contact with object memory. (Rather, it only makes contact with the controlled representation, which requires attention to make contact with memory). The serial model therefore predicts no recognition in the absence of visual attention, a prediction that is inconsistent with the findings of Tipper (1985) and Tipper and Driver (1988) .
An alternative account of the additivity is suggested by a model recently proposed by Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) . This model differs from the serial model in that it assumes that both the automatic and controlled representations make direct contact with object memory. This parallel model accounts for the finding that recognition does not require attention, but to a first approximation, it also seems to predict a subadditive interaction between attention and viewpoint (rather than the observed additivity). However, the parallel model only predicts subadditivity if one assumes that the automatic representation is primed just as much without attention as it is with attention. (If one does not make this assumption, then the automatic representation is perhaps better termed the semi-automatic representation.) In fact, according to the Hummel and Stankiewicz model, even the semi-automatic representation profits from visual attention. According to this model, the interaction between attention and viewpoint could be subadditive, additive, or even superadditive, depending on the proportion of the semi-automatic representation that gets primed without attention. The smaller the fraction that gets primed without attention, the more the interaction should tend toward superadditivity; the greater the fraction, the more the interaction should tend toward subadditivity; additivity lies somewhere in the middle. In its current state, the model predicts an interaction in the additive to superadditive range. In all other respects, this model accounts for the current findings in the same way as the serial model. For example, the parallel model--like the serial model--predicts complete invariance at long prime-probe delays, assuming that the semi-automatic priming is short-lived. Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) 
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The reason for the superadditivity prediction of the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) model is subtle, but it is worth considering because it relates closely to the reasoning behind the prediction that attention should be necessary to prime the left-fight reflection of an object's image. Readers who are uninterested in these details can proceed to the next section. The Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) model is motivated by two seemingly contradictory sets of findings in the object recognition literature. One set of findings suggests that human object recognition is mediated, at least in part, by the activation of a structural description specifying an object's parts and their interrelations (for reviews, see Cooper et al., 1992; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996; Quinlan, 1991) ; the other suggests that humans recognize objects both automatically and rapidly~arguably faster than it is theoretically possible to generate a structural description from an object's image (because of the need for dynamic binding; see Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996) . The Hummel and Stankiewicz model resolves this dilemma by recognizing objects on the basis of two independent (but integrated) representations of object shape.
One representation, the independent geon array (IGA), is a collection of units that represent the shape attributes of an object's parts (geons) and their interrelations. In the IGA, every attribute is represented independently of every other (i.e., each attribute has its own unit). This independence gives the IGA considerable flexibility, and permits it to discount some variations in viewpoint (such as left-right reflection) as a natural consequence Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996) . The cost of the independence is that it requires a mechanism for actively (dynamically) binding attributes into collections of corresponding parts . If dynamic binding requires attention (as discussed in the introduction), then visual attention should be required to generate a useful representation on the IGA. Taken in isolation, the IGA (like the Hummel & Biederman, 1992, model) predicts that object recognition should require visual attention.
The second representation, the substructure matrix (SSM), is a collection of units that represent geon attributes, not independently, but at each of several locations in a coarse coordinate system. (The coordinate system is semi-objectcentered. It is invariant with translation and scale, but it is sensitive to rotation and left-right reflection.) The SSM (in contrast to the IGA) does not rely on dynamic binding to preserve the grouping of shape attributes into geons. This function is performed by the geons' differing positions in the coordinate space. As such, the SSM (but not the IGA) can represent an object's shape in a manner suitable for recognition, even when the resources necessary for dynamic binding (i.e., attention and processing time) are not available. However, the SSM is sensitive to left-right reflection: The representation of a given object facing to the left may be completely different from the representation of the same object facing to the right.
If recognition without attention is mediated by the SSM alone, then priming without attention should be sensitive to left-right reflection (consistent with the findings reported here). If recognition with attention is mediated by both the SSM and the IGA, then priming with attention should be partly invariant with left-right reflection (also consistent with the findings reported here). And if priming in the SSM is short-lived, then priming over long prime-probe delays should be completely invariant with left-right reflection (as observed by Biederman & Cooper, 1991a, and in Experiment 3) . This model predicts a superadditive relationship between attention and viewpoint (which the findings reported here do not support): Priming for attended images in the same view should be (slightly) greater than the sum of priming for ignored objects in the same view and priming for attended images in the reflected view. The reason for this prediction has to do with the relationship between attention and the SSM.
When an image is first presented to the model, it is initially represented (as a whole) as a pattern of activation on both the IGA and the SSM. If the image is attended, then it will eventually be segmented into its parts (following , and each part will be represented by its own pattern on both the IGA and the SSM. Thus, an attended image with N parts will be represented as a collection of2N + 2 patterns: N + 1 on the IGA (one pattern for each part plus one for the image as a whole) and N + I on the SSM. Ignored images are not segmented, so an ignored image will be represented by only one pattern on the IGA and one on the SSM.
With these details in hand, it is now possible to explain why the model predicts superadditivity between attention and viewpoint. Attending to an image activates and primes N + I patterns on the IGA and N + 1 patterns on the SSM (a total of 2N + 2 patterns). If that image is subsequently presented again in the same viewpoint (after a short enough interval), then all 2N + 2 primed patterns will facilitate recognition. If the attended image is subsequently presented in the left-right reflected view, then the N + 1 primed patterns on the IGA will facilitate recognition, but the N + 1 primed patterns on the SSM will not (recall that the IGA, but not the SSM, is invariant with left-right reflection). Ignoring an image will prime one pattern on the IGA and one on the SSM. If that ignored image is presented again in the same view, then these two primed patterns will facilitate recognition. Adding the priming for an ignored image in the same view (corresponding two patterns) to the priming for an attended image in the left-right reflected view (N + 1 patterns) results in the sum 2 + N + 1, or N + 3. This sum is less than the priming obtained for attended images in the same view (2N + 2): Attention and viewpoint are superaddifive. This analysis is completely linear in that the sources of priming were compared simply by adding them together. If one assumes that these sources of priming are subjected to a nonlinearity in the processes of activating a representation in memory (the very reasonable assumption that leads to the original prediction of subadditivity), then the magnitude of the predicted superadditivity may be reduced substantially. But as this analysis shows, the parallel model of the automatic (or semi-automatic) and controlled representations does not necessarily predict a subadditive relationship between attention and viewpoint.
Early Versus Late Selection
The findings reported here have important implications in the context of the question of early versus late selection: Consistent with the late selection view, our findings (like those of Tipper, 1985, and others) suggest that humans can recognize objects without attending to them. But consistent with the early selection view, our findings suggest that attention nonetheless plays an important role in object representation: Although attention does not determine whether an object will be recognized, it determines how it will be represented for recognition.
Properties of the Two Shape Representations
The present experiments revealed some of the properties of the visual representations activated with attention (the controlled representation) and without attention (the automatic representation). We can draw further insights about the nature of the controlled representation from other experiments that have used long-term priming to investigate the visual representation of shape. (These experiments can inform our understanding of the controlled representation because we have shown that priming for the automatic representation is short-lived, whereas the priming for the controlled representation is longer lasting.) Together, these experiments and the experiments reported here are beginning to paint a picture of the differences between the shape representations generated with and without attention. On the basis of such experiments, we can infer that the controlled representation is based on volumetric parts (Biederman & Cooper, 1991b) , is invariant with scale , and is possibly invariant with rotation in depth (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993 ; but see Edelman & Bttlthoff, 1992; Tart, 1995) . Some of these properties are summarized in Table 1 .
The paradigm used in the experiments reported here suggests itself as a tool to help fill the empty cells of Table 1 . An important question concerns the nature of the visual primitives used by the automatic representation. Although the controlled representation appears to use simple volumetric parts (e.g., geons), it remains to be seen whether the automatic representations also use geon-like primitives. Another open question about automatic representation conterns its sensitivity to changes in scale, translation, and rotations in depth. It is important to recognize that the current experiments speak to the role of attention in generating a representation of shape that is invariant with left-right (Biederman & Cooper, 1991b) reflection and not to the role of attention in compensating for all changes in viewpoint. Some models, such as the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) model, generate scale-and translation-invariant shape representations without attention, whereas other models, such as the Olshausen et al. (1993) model, explicitly implicate attention in compensating for these viewpoint changes. Future experiments will investigate the role of attention in compensating for other viewpoint changes. Some findings suggest that the visual system stores one or more canonical (or preferred) views of each known object. Presumably, which view is canonical is a function of experience (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1985; Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981; Tart & Pinker, 1989) . Another interesting question concerns whether the automatic and controlled representations show different sensitivities to experience. The Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996) model predicts that the controlled representation should be less sensitive to experience (i.e., showing less "preference" for canonical views) than the automatic representation.
Viewpoint Invariance Versus Viewpoint Sensitivity
There is a long-standing debate in the object recognition community regarding the extent to which the representations mediating human object recognition are invariant with, versus sensitive to, viewpoint (see Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1995; Tart & Biilthoff, 1995) . Proponents of the normalization-based approach argue that objects are represented in a view-sensitive format, whereas proponents of the structural description approach argue that objects are represented in a more view-invariant format. There is evidence for both views (for reviews, see Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993 , 1995 Cooper et al., 1992; Tarr, 1995) . For example, Biederman and Cooper (1992) reported long-term priming results suggesting that object recognition is scale-invariant. But using a same--different paradigm, Bundesen and Larsen (1975) found that people responded faster when the to-becompared objects were the same size than when they were different sizes, suggesting that object recognition is scalesensitive. Similarly, using a same name--different name task, Ellis and Allport (1986) found evidence for view sensitivity at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs; less than 2 s), but no effects of viewpoint at longer SOAs. In response to these and other seemingly inconsistent results, it is not uncommon to suggest that object recognition is based on more than one representation, one viewpoint-sensitive, and the other more viewpoint-invariant (Corballis, 1988; Ellis & Allport, 1986; Farah, 1992; Jolicoeur, 1992) . However, with the exception of a few studies (Ellis & Allport, 1986; Ellis et al., 1989; Farah, 1992; Tarr & Pinker, 1992) , most of the evidence for such a dual representation has been largely indirect because it comes from different experiments using different paradigms.
The experiments presented here provide additional direct evidence for multiple representations of object shape, one more robust to variations in viewpoint than the other. In addition, these experiments demonstrate another important difference between these two forms of visual representation: one requires attention and the other does not. It is tempting to speculate that some of the invariances observed by others reflect the properties of the controlled representation while some of the view sensitivities reflect the automatic representation. If one entertains this speculation, then one may begin to better understand some of the properties of these representations. For example, many demonstrations of viewpoint sensitivity are based on same-different judgment tasks, in which the time between the target and the probe is relatively short (on the order of seconds; for a review, see . Interstimulus intervals of this duration are within the time frame for the priming we found for the viewpointsensitive automatic representation. It is therefore plausible that both the automatic and controlled representations will manifest themselves in participants' performance on such tasks. If either (or both) of these representations is sensitive to viewpoint, then such tasks will demonstrate viewpoint sensitivity. By contrast, experiments using a long-term priming paradigm (with prime-probe delays on the order of minutes) more often show viewpoint invariance (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993) . In the context of our findings, the lag between the prime and probe displays in these experiments is longer than the implicit memory trace we observed for the automatic representation. If the memory trace for the automatic representation has dissipated by the time the probe is displayed, then one may only observe the effects of the more view-invariant representation.
Conclusions
The findings reported here suggest that the visual representation generated in response to an attended object is qualitatively different from that generated in response to an ignored object. Importantly, recognition takes place in both cases: Object recognition does not require attention. But the properties of the representations that mediate recognition depend substantially on whether the object is attended or ignored.
